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Primacy without a Plan?
NATHAN FREIER

“Most people assume there are all sorts of ‘master plans’ being pursued
throughout the US government. But, amazingly, we are still searching for
a vision to replace the decades-long containment strategy that America
pursued to counter the Soviet threat.”
1
— Thomas Barnett

T

extbook models for policy and strategy formulation argue that grand strategic success relies on the effective development of a rational, consistent,
meaningful, and—to some extent—consensus grand strategic design that enforces discipline and unity over the discrete policy choices of American government.2 One can, for example, make a cogent argument that foundational
Cold War efforts like Kennan’s “long telegram” and his “X” article (“Sources
of Soviet Conduct”); NSC 20/4 (“US Objectives with Respect to the USSR to
Counter Soviet Threats to US Security”); NSC 68 (“United States Objectives
and Programs for National Security”); the Eisenhower Solarium Project; and,
finally, NSC 162/2 (“Basic National Security Policy”) established just such a
grand strategic foundation; and further, that this foundation, with some subsequent and at times substantial course correction and style adjustment, informed
and guided strategic decisionmakers for half a century.3
These foundational Cold War initiatives chartered grand strategic
choices for the nation that were ends-focused, progressively ways- and meansrationalized and thus more readily risk-informed. They enabled senior decisionmakers to see discrete policy choices within a strategic context that was
broader and often more consequential than that which defined and bounded the
most immediate challenges and crises of the day. In the end, it is safe to say that
they enabled successive executives to make effective and rational cost-benefit
calculations that enforced some consistency on policy decisions over time. By
doing so, they also underwrote an ordered defense of the nation’s long-term
strategic interests.
Autumn 2006
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The post-Cold War reality is unfortunately quite different. Over a
half decade of blue-ribbon panels, think-tank research, and expert commentary have made it quite clear that, since the end of the Cold War, the nation has
had no grand strategy.4 Nor, for that matter, does it have the capacity for
meaningful net assessment and planning.5 There is no risk-informed grand
strategy or consensus strategic vision guiding American great power or enforcing discipline over the employment of those instruments of power so
critical to securing American primacy most effectively. There is no standing
design chartering broad, integrated American political, military, and economic action to secure the state’s position and influence in a rational and deliberate way.6 Frankly, the exercise of American influence is not, as many
imagine and as Thomas Barnett quips about in the quotation at the beginning
of this article, the product of some deliberative, whole-of-government process enforcing unity, order, and focus on the nation’s instruments of power.
Instead, American power is employed against discrete challenges in isolation
as they arise with neither detailed nor comprehensive, whole-of-government
consideration of the broader implications or risks associated with either action or inaction.7
Believing otherwise—believing, for example, that the nation is operating according to some coordinated grand doctrine that has been both
vetted by and socialized across the whole of the American government—
implies that three key questions can be answered satisfactorily. First, since
the end of the Cold War, has the United States corporately devoted the requisite intellectual and political energy necessary to truly understand its own relative position in detail and the real obstacles, risks, and costs associated with
maintaining that position over time? Second, has the United States developed
a consensus grand design that employs all of the enormous potential embodied in its instruments of power in order to secure its strategic position and influence effectively against direct and indirect challenges to both?8 Finally, if
one believes the previous two questions can be answered in the affirmative,
have the nation’s strategy elite identified and articulated the principal aspects
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of the resultant grand design and have they assessed and accounted for the
real costs associated with pursuing it in a meaningful way? Reasonable analysts will conclude that the answer to all three questions is no.9

Opportunity Lost?
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the power dynamics of international politics changed for certain. Yet American policy elites in and out of
power never fully appreciated that this fundamental and quite favorable sea
change in the distribution of power still required some deliberate and thoughtful consideration of the nation’s newly acquired, singular position of dominant
influence.10 These same elites also failed to undertake any serious appraisal of
the extraordinary demands associated with maintaining the nation’s dominant
position against an expanding sea of smaller but nonetheless uniquely capable
and complex strategic competitors and challenges. This newly recognized
universe of challenges ranged from the purely economic, political, and obstructionist to the irreconcilably violent and dangerous. Today, this universe
includes states, transnational movements, sub-state spoilers, and even individuals. In the 2006 report Integrated Power: A National Security Strategy for the
21st Century, Lawrence Korb and Robert Boorstin agree, observing:
From the fall of the Berlin Wall to the collapse of the Twin Towers to the invasion
and occupation of Iraq, the United States has lacked a national security strategy
that properly reflects the reality of a new era. This despite the fact that today’s
geopolitical situation is markedly different from the Cold War era, when our
country had a clear, coherent, and widely supported plan that focused on containing and deterring Soviet Communist expansion. And this despite the events of
September 11, 2001, which reshaped the way Americans looked at the world.11

Absent the Cold War’s compulsion for political discipline on issues
of grand strategy—a discipline imposed by the threat of imminent nuclear
confrontation—the strategic environment within which the United States
would in the future defend its political, economic, and security advantages was
at once abundantly more complex and unpredictable. Yet then and now, in spite
of 15 years of post-Cold War experience, much of this complexity remained
and remains unaccounted for in a deliberate and objective way. Despite continuing post-Cold War, mainstream consensus on the need to maintain the nation’s dominant position, there simply has never been any serious effort made
to appreciate how the nation might do so effectively, employing its broad instruments of power under such radically different strategic circumstances.12
Many outside of Washington officialdom have recognized that employment of
the classical instruments of power—particularly military power—in tradiAutumn 2006
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tional combinations and according to 20th-century rules would be at best less
relevant to securing American primacy in the 21st century. However, those exercising or destined to exercise decisive influence over the strategic direction
of the nation failed to recognize this transformative event in sufficient detail,
and thus opted instead for a form of business as usual.
There was at the end of the Cold War and is today a desperate need
for strategic innovation and a new commitment to reasoned grand strategy.13
Nuance, consensus-building, burden-sharing, strategic deliberation and patience, risk management, policy discipline, humility, and, above all, temperance are necessities for the effective defense of American position in the 21st
century. However, all of these were and remain in increasingly short supply,
as American decisionmakers continue demonstrating an almost messianic
confidence in the strength, durability, vitality, and universal appeal of American post-Cold War dominance.14
Chronic overconfidence comes from post-Cold War triumphalism.
Many, viewing the world through the prism of 19th- and 20th-century great
power, believed the United States emerged from the Cold War unchallenged
and unchallengeable—even bulletproof—in grand strategic terms. Thus,
grand strategy died. In the minds of many, absent effective great-power competition, there was no longer a need for grand strategy.15 Conventional wisdom held that the deliberate maintenance of position need not be so deliberate
if the United States could continue underwriting a secure status quo solely by
drawing on what many thought to be an unlimited and invulnerable supply of
strategic advantages. There simply was no need to evaluate relative position
and plan deliberately to maintain it, if that position was and would remain
unassailable.
Today, strategic decisionmaking is dominated more by regionalists
and policy wonks than by grand strategists.16 In this environment, national interests are often conflated with the narrower interests of popular whim, individual executive departments and their bureaucracies, even ambitious and
convincing politicos jealously pursuing discrete policy interests and exercising power disproportionate to their official position. Under these circumstances, policy decisions that trigger either action or inaction can, without
some care, unknowingly expose the nation to enormous risk. For example,
absent the guiding hand of a consistent grand strategy and without some advanced and thoroughgoing assessment of strategic risk and cost in context, it
is simply unknowable whether the most expedient and direct route to deposing a hostile regime is not, at the same time, fundamentally disruptive to the
reasoned defense of the nation’s strategic position in the future. Likewise,
though it may seem outwardly intuitive, it is equally unclear whether or not
new nuclear states are intolerable or manageable. And, if they are the former,
8
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whether the United States can do anything about them without incurring some
prohibitive grand strategic cost.
It is simply safe to say that deliberative net assessment, strategy development, and strategic planning are not employed as “best practices” for
the exercise of American great power. There is, to be sure, a surplus of unclassified statements of strategy that purport to govern the nation’s approach to
broad national security issues, national defense and military affairs, homeland security, terrorism, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, cyber-security, and
so on. However, all rely heavily on form over substance and focus more on delivering strategic communications themes than they do on establishing real,
actionable, risk-tested strategic or grand strategic priorities.17 In the end,
therefore, none satisfies, in whole or in part, the very real and growing need
for a more fundamental ends-focused, ways- and means-rationalized, and
risk-informed grand strategy governing the deliberate maintenance of American position and influence into an indefinite strategic future. It is simply
assumed as a matter of faith that American primacy is in principle secure at its
foundation—no matter what the risk and cost associated with maintaining it.

Primacy of the Comfortable, Vulnerable, and Unaware
I propose an alternative perspective that calls the assumption that
closed the previous section into serious question. This view accepts that the
nation’s absolute power, in classically realist terms, may be unassailable for
the foreseeable future; in short, its material capacity may in fact be somewhat
secure from fundamental dislocation. However, its relative position of power
and influence may at the same time be increasingly vulnerable to some conscious, internal repudiation of the high costs and risks associated with maintaining American primacy. Thus, though the United States may have all the
potential power necessary to maintain its position, the will to employ that
power most effectively may be at increasing risk. The framers of NSC 68
feared the same in 1950 when they observed:
We run . . . the added risk of being confused and immobilized by our inability to
weigh and choose, and pursue a firm course based on a rational assessment of
each. The risk that we may thereby be prevented or too long delayed in taking
all needful measures to maintain the integrity and vitality of our system is great.
The risk that our allies will lose their determination is greater. And the risk that
in this manner a descending spiral of too little and too late, of doubt and recrimination, may present us with even narrower and more desperate alternatives, is
the greatest risk of all.18

The events of 9/11 changed only our perspective on the world, not our
approach to it. The realities of post-modern great power and primacy were sudAutumn 2006
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denly at the nation’s doorstep, seemingly unannounced and without the benefit
of advanced consideration of how to both protect our physical security while,
at the same time, securing and extending our long-term strategic position
across Morgenthau’s elements of power. American great power relies on three
key but vulnerable sources of strength for its continued vitality: a homeland secure from fundamental dislocation or disruption,19 a strong and vibrant network of alliances and partnerships founded on common interests and values,20
and a population and its opinion elites inured to the inherent costs of primacy.21
The events of 9/11 and subsequent experience have made clear the inherent
vulnerability of all three.
From the end of the Cold War to 9/11, there had been an obvious and
natural erosion of common interest and discipline in the nation’s traditional
alliances and partnerships. Further, many had begun warning that the political, economic, and physical security of the American homeland itself was increasingly vulnerable to attack by sub-state and transnational actors less
constrained by the norms and conventions that govern international relations.
Finally, all Americans had grown comfortable with the benefits of primary influence, but had done so with little appreciation for the substantial fiscal, material, human, psychological, and political burdens that could be associated
with its continued maintenance over time. Thus, many were caught quite unaware by the steady accumulation of real cost that began suddenly with the
9/11 attacks and that has continued unabated ever since.
With respect to the latter source of strength in particular—a population inured to the costs associated with primacy—there continues to be some
genuine shock among average and elite Americans alike that ubiquitous
American influence breeds resistance and unease. This dangerous naiveté ignores a central maxim of international politics—great power engenders respect but it also foments fear, envy, and venom as well. Worse, it hazards a
persistent underappreciation of the accumulating costs associated with maintaining American primacy in a world increasingly marked by open resistance
to and mistrust of US power and motivations. It is difficult for many Americans to reconcile in their own minds the idea that the United States can be admired, revered, and relied on, while at the same time actively resisted,
balanced against, and hated as well.22 This cognitive dissonance can result in
imprudent denial of political realism where some in the American strategy
elite are captured by unachievable, risk-untested political rhetoric at the expense of real strategic calculation.
This unique and difficult position makes for very turbulent and
treacherous strategic waters which, to be sure, are best navigated by design
rather than chance. This is the inhospitable environment that honest postmodern national security strategists must occupy and conquer. It is an envi10
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ronment that requires far more Thomas Hobbes than many would like to admit. Successful defense of American position and interests often requires
suspension of ideal goals in favor of more stable, often minimally favorable,
but still acceptable alternatives.
Self-awareness and early acknowledgment are often identified as essential first steps in overcoming addiction. If this is true, then the United States
and its strategists can break what amounts to a dangerous dependency on idealism only by recognizing two very important realties about the American position
of dominant power and influence. First, no one—except the most powerful—
considers dominant global power to be benign. Thus, resistance and obstruction
to the United States are natural and unavoidable components of the post-Cold
War, post-9/11 strategic environment.23 Further, current American dominance in
traditional realms of security competition will most assuredly guarantee that any
active, violent resistance to it will be, by definition, irregular and catastrophic in
character. Indeed, it is clear that the United States has likely entered a period of
persistent irregular and potentially catastrophic conflict that will present it with
the most immediate and consequential physical and psychological challenges to
its position and influence.24 Thus, a national security structure that remains optimized to confront increasingly lower-probability traditional threats—even under the guise of transformation—will face fundamental challenges without some
substantial structural and cultural adjustment.
Second, great power is neither exercised nor retained effectively
without strict adherence to a long-term, self-interested grand design that jealously protects the nation’s key sources of strength but also employs power judiciously. This is not to suggest that the United States should exercise power
without some reference to its moral compass, core values, or beliefs. However, it does imply that the nation should calculate its real, tangible interests
first and then identify those areas where its morals, values, beliefs, and interests intersect most decisively in order to establish priorities for action.25
Failure to come to terms physically, morally, or psychologically with
either of these realities will only bring political and grand strategic disappointment. Failure in the first instance, for example, hazards naïve optimism about
how the United States and its actions will be perceived by others around the
world. The United States ignores the history of great powers at its peril. Failure
with respect to the second will see the United States erode its finite capacity,
addressing the immediate and most visually evocative traditional challenges at
the expense of husbanding its capacity to contend decisively with what may be
its less obvious or less immediate but nonetheless more important and truly
strategic challenges.
Uninformed by a grand design that takes the aforementioned to heart
and then identifies where the nation is headed, how it will proceed, what obAutumn 2006
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stacles it can expect to encounter, and, finally, in what condition it would like
to arrive at its destination, American great power today appears only capable
of attacking one big challenge at a time. And even then ineffectively, given no
rational whole-of-government capacity for net assessment, strategy development, strategic planning, and risk assessment. In the absence of grand design,
the United States is left to employ its enormous power reactively and sometimes haphazardly. As a result, US policy can, both in perception and fact, be
more short-sighted, less judicious, more arbitrary, and perhaps more martial
than it either should or has to be. The United States may enjoy immediate,
transient success as a result of some policy choices. However, at what cost to
its yet-undefined, enduring grand strategic interests and, indeed, at what
price to those around the world upon whom the United States depends for
some assistance in protecting and extending its primary influence?
Absent some revolutionary change in the thinking of the most senior
in the strategy development and strategic decisionmaking arena, these circumstances will persist. And while the United States enjoys unprecedented international influence and power now, it hazards precipitous loss of both by its
own errors of strategic omission and commission in the future. Indeed, strategic action—undertaken without reference to some guiding vision or consensus
destination; without conscious, risk-informed choices; and without some deliberate strategic plan for achieving minimum acceptable outcomes—can
serve to undermine, vice underwrite, American great power in very short order.26 Thus, the high cost of primacy is rarely accounted for, nor is it ever effectively communicated to the population and their opinion elites. As a result, the
United States may have all the potential power necessary to maintain its position of influence, but the will to employ that power most effectively may at the
same time be at substantial risk. This may be true at the very time that many
around the world believe implicitly in the necessity of continued American primacy as a real bulwark against disorder and insecurity.27

The Iraq War in Context
We know the future is unknowable. But you can’t plan a great nation’s steps
based on everything, quote, “being unknowable.”
— US Senator Joseph Biden28

The war in Iraq in microcosm has proven illustrative of the very real
hazards associated with exercising great power in the absence of grand strategy. An honest inventory of the strategic environment concludes that aspects
of the ongoing conflict in Iraq challenge the nation’s three sources of strength
fundamentally. Indeed, Iraq demonstrates quite well the intrinsic connection
between today’s strategic choices, the continued security of the aforemen12
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tioned vulnerable sources of strength, and tomorrow’s capacity to effectively
defend American position, interests, and influence.
With regard to the first source of strength—a secure homeland—the
United States must anticipate that the intervention in Iraq will trigger some
extremist blowback. Further, it would be prudent to expect that one legacy of
the war in Iraq might be a persistent challenge to the American homeland
hatched from within the resistance movements now concentrated against the
United States in the northern Arabian Gulf and Afghanistan. Given the terrorists’ increasing capacity for unbounded violence, this more intense and motivated irregular challenge may in fact threaten the United States with some
fundamental disruption or dislocation. Indeed, it is almost certain to threaten
the same for a number of key strategic partners around the world.
This does not imply that increased extremist resistance will succeed.
Nor does it imply that inaction in the hope of avoiding some near-term increase in violence is acceptable. Rather, it recognizes that—as in the case of
the “Afghan Arabs” in the wake of the Soviet war in Afghanistan—there will
be some post-conflict terrorist reckoning that, while free-riding on the uncontrollable forces of globalization, will challenge the interests of the United
States over time.29 It may be that this reckoning will include some significant
near-term increase in the virulence of the terrorist challenge. That this is so
should not necessarily inhibit strategic action; rather, it should be an important consideration in the cost-benefit calculations that are so crucial to effective strategic decisionmaking.
With regard to the second source of strength—a strong and vibrant
network of alliances and partnerships—it is abundantly clear that the Iraq
War has had some negative impact on American relationships around the
world. The extent to which the impact is permanent is open to question. However, American decisionmakers should be mindful of two important considerations that can, without some deliberate management, erode the reach and
strength of American influence over time. Both are essential considerations
for grand strategy development and long-term risk assessment. Each has been
made more problematic by the type of great-power activism the United States
has demonstrated since the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
First, absent compelling threats to their physical existence, some of
the United States’ closest partners are suddenly freer to pursue their own discrete national interests in ways that are sometimes at odds with the most conventional conceptions of alliance discipline. This implies that key partners of
the United States are increasingly likely to weigh policy options far more independently than they have in the past. They are likelier, as a result, also to
follow the political imperatives that are most associated with their own narrow national interests when arriving at their most important strategic deciAutumn 2006
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“The greatest risk to American position is not
defeat at the hands of a peer competitor, but slow
voluntary retreat from international activism.”

sions. This will occur at the expense of some of the more abstract common
interests they share with their traditional allies or strategic partners. Second,
close association with the United States may become very costly in human,
fiscal, material, political, and psychological terms to those foreign partners
upon whom the active maintenance of American position and influence is
most reliant for steadfast support. They too will become the targets of those
prone to actively resist American great power. Thus, American position and
influence may become increasingly vulnerable to the risk calculations of a
handful of foreign political leaders who are themselves vulnerable to voting
populations and who are thus certain to pay some price for their government’s
continued alignment with the United States.
Finally, with respect to the third source of strength—an American
population inured to the high cost of primacy—it is important to remember
that great power, latent or otherwise, will invariably engender some general
resistance from the less powerful. This is less a matter of theology—good
versus evil—than it is one of natural or social law—the instincts of fight or
flight, or the conflict between haves and have-nots. In particular, an activist
great power like the United States, no matter its motives, can expect that even
modest employment of its enormous capacity will provoke substantial physical and political resistance from some quarters. Additionally, it is inevitable
that a continuing perception of American unilateralism among some will trigger active balancing behavior as well. Friend and foe alike who perceive dangerous inequity in the global distribution of power or who sense in the current
distribution of power a more fundamental, existential challenge will seek to
effectively limit American influence through recourse to active resistance
and obstruction. Thus, the mere possession and retention of dominant influence, as well as its active employment, will engender some substantial cost.
Americans and those who are decisive in shaping their beliefs need to become
accustomed to these costs. Without some recognition of them, the United
States hazards popular repudiation of international activism.
With regard to Iraq specifically, there are real indications that the
broad costs associated with American great-power activism there are increasingly prohibitive to many Americans. Indeed, this appears to be translating
14
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into a more generalized rejection of those activist foreign and security policies that might be essential to the retention of dominant great power into the
indefinite future.30 If one accepts that the nation’s unique position of strength
relies on continued activism, then it is safe to assume that increased popular
sentiment against activism places that position in some significant jeopardy.
Allowed to continue, this trend is certain to affect the strategic decisionmaking of those vulnerable at the ballot box. Collective self-doubt, excessive
caution, and self-deterrence are natural by-products of a popular rejection of
activism. Thus, as a result, the active retention of the nation’s position and influence may at some point become unsustainable.
It appears that when the broad cost of any one aspect of activism
greatly exceeds popular expectations, the whole enterprise of American great
power itself may be wounded. Among the three sources of strength, a decisive
loss of popular and, by implication, political will might be the most dangerous
and debilitating. If the population cannot be convinced of the very tangible
benefits of primary influence—if, for example, Americans see only the downsides associated with primacy—then they cannot be expected to bear the burdens necessary to secure the nation’s position of influence over time.
None of the above is intended to imply that the risks associated with
the Iraq War are excessive or that its costs automatically inhibit the future defense of wider American interests. It is meant only to argue that those risks
and costs must be weighed within a grand strategic context. What should be
clear by now with respect to Iraq and grand strategy is that the war is not occurring in a strategic vacuum. Rather, it is occurring within a broader and perhaps as yet undefined strategic context where competing and arguably more
enduring interests hang in the balance. In short, there are risk considerations
of some consequence that exist above and adjacent to the immediate operational and theater strategic challenges in Iraq. In this environment, one can
see how the mounting costs of the war can place the future of American primacy itself at some substantial risk.

Conclusion—What Is at Stake?
Describing a time half a century ago, the authors of NSC 68 wrote,
“Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged . . . by violent or
non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency.”31 The
same language might be used today. If the United States has entered a period of
persistent irregular and catastrophic resistance and friction—a period of endemic conflict not unlike that suggested by those words from NSC-68— now is
not the time to ignore the imperative for grand strategic calculation. The United
States cannot afford to satisfy the immediate demands of its strategic present at
the expense of its grand strategic future. It can no longer make discrete policy
Autumn 2006
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of enormous import without some reference to a coherent grand design.32 In
short order, the United States needs to assess its relative position holistically,
determine a consensus vision for the future of American great power, and then
chart the most effective ends-focused, ways- and means-rationalized, and riskinformed route to secure that position over time. This demands more than
rhetorical strategy. In fact, it demands a new, comprehensive vision for the sustained maintenance of American great power that establishes priorities, places
discrete circumstances like Iraq in their proper strategic context, clinically recognizes that resistance and obstruction are natural aspects of a very dangerous
environment, and accounts for the real and accumulating costs of primacy in a
deliberate and rational way.
Though it will be costly, most agree that the active maintenance of the
nation’s dominant position is essential, if for no other reason than to ensure
continued US control over its own future. In addition, many have argued that
American hegemony—humbly applied—will benefit more people worldwide
than would a return to the chaos and uncontrolled competition of multipolarity.33 It is wise counsel to recall that much about the American course once
rested on decisions made in foreign capitals. Today, it is clear that American
strategy elites prefer exercising exclusive control over the nation’s strategic future and those key aspects of the environment that will most affect the character
of that future. Yet it is not clear that the American population and their elites are
socialized in ways that will allow them to chart the most prudent and forwardlooking path to do so or to accept the costs and burdens associated with it.
In the end, guaranteeing the nation’s position of primary influence—
ensuring decisive retention of both the capacity and will to employ American
great power effectively—relies on conscious strategic choices born of deliberation and not impulse. Thus, the war on terror cannot effectively constitute the
sum total of the nation’s grand strategy, as it constitutes a national response to
just one of many challenges to American primary influence.34 A more comprehensive defense against the myriad sources of friction and resistance likely to
accumulate over time is required. Clearly, messianic terrorists and irresponsible mullahs undermine the security of American position and interests at
their foundation, but these challenges exist alongside others that are or will be
equally exigent now and in the future.
Today, states compete with other states and entities economically as
much if not more than they do in the realm of security. Thus, maintaining the
level of competitiveness essential to continued economic dominance demands the same type of strategic calculation once devoted exclusively to
physical security. Additionally, the state and the state system are increasingly
vulnerable to the forces of unchecked globalization, while the increasing
strength of the simple and compelling idea, identity, ethnicity, and religion all
16
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“The United States ignores the history of
great powers at its peril.”

compete against state identification as key principles of social organization.
Combined, these erode the foundations of already fragile political systems,
fuel the pervasive under-governance so endemic to a number of critical regions worldwide, and increase the likelihood that a state of strategic significance will succumb to its own internal weakness and cause the world some
untold catastrophe. All present challenges to physical security, human development, and the spread of effective representative governance. Finally, some
prospective great-power challengers and potentially hostile great-power ententes remain on the horizon. But while these sources of competition are traditional in character, it is now likelier that their preferred form of resistance
will be surreptitious employment of physical, political, and economic “violence” rather than direct military confrontation. Without some detailed crossgovernment consideration, these actors could compete with the United States
for niche primacy at a future date.
This short list is not exhaustive, but rather illustrative. It should, however, indicate the degree of complexity confronting today’s grand strategist.
Embedded in this complexity is one certainty: The nation simply cannot depend solely on intuition to determine what is and is not important. Interestbased calculation must prevail. Thus, strategic choices need to be made within
some broader ends-focused strategic context and with some reference to a
grand destination for the nation and its people. Without this, the nation’s
strength might be consumed by increasingly costly efforts, focused on achieving the truly unachievable—absolute security—at the expense of achieving
what is both attainable and minimally necessary to the sustained retention of
American position and influence. Indeed, American decisionmakers and the
US population ought to become content with managing (and not necessarily
eliminating) active resistance, forcing it below the threshold of strategic significance, while pursuing a grand strategy that focuses on securing and extending
the nation’s advantages in ways that will both underwrite sustained retention
of its strategic position and stable political, economic, and security development worldwide.
Today, the greatest risk to American position is not defeat at the hands
of a peer competitor, but slow voluntary retreat from international activism
hastened by a cultural aversion to grand strategic calculation and risk assessAutumn 2006

17

ment. Quite simply, the end of American primacy may come via a persistent,
unwelcome, and unanticipated accumulation of strategic costs, as successive
American executives exercise great power without reference to grand design,
and as average Americans, their most influential opinion elites, and those
states upon whom the United States relies for support grow increasingly weary
of the price associated with doing so. Absent a real ends-focused, ways and
means-rationalized, and risk-informed grand design, the United States is vulnerable to slow surrender to strategic exhaustion and voluntary retreat from
that essential activism necessary to the security of its position in perpetuity.
NOTES
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